


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DELIBERATE THOUGHTS
ON THE
SYSTEM
Of our LATE
TREATIES
WITH
HESSE - CASSELL and RUSSIA,
IN
Regard to HANOVER.



By Sam^l Martine Esq^r

L O N D O N:
(Printed for J. SCOTT, at the Black Swan in
Pater-noster Row,

MDCCLVI.

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DELIBERATE THOUGHTS

ON THE

S Y S T E M

OF OUR LATE

T R E A T I E S, &c.

IT is Matter of some Surprize, to observe how many Pamphlets have been published in Defence of our subsidiary Treaties lately concluded with *Russia*, and *Hesse-Cassel*; and how few on the other Side of the Question. For in Sir *Robert Walpole's* Days, the great Body of political Writers used to range itself in the Opposition: while a few solitary Stragglers drew their Grey-Goose Weapons in Behalf of the Administration.

IN what View our M——s may look upon the present extraordinary Flight of ministerial Pamphleteers, and whether they may consider it as a good Omen of their Popularity, I know not. But were I in their Situation I should tremble for the Consequence; concluding, that so large an Assemblage of Authors could be brought together by nothing but the Allure-

ments and Scent of Prey. I should expect daily Demands for every Exciseman's and Tide-waiter's vacant Place, upon the Merit of Pieces written in Praise of my Honour's Measures. And if this should happen, it will greatly distress the grand Dispenser of Employments; those inferior Offices have been hitherto deemed the proper Rewards for useful Borough-voters, who will think their Rights invaded by the Introduction of so many Foreigners. For I do not believe it to be possible to extend much lower the present commodious Practice of splitting Offices. An Author might perhaps catch at the smallest Twig of an Office: but I can never be persuaded; that a meritorious Member of a Corporation will condescend to be a joint Tide-waiter or Co-exciseman with one of those political Pamphleteers.

BUT whatsoever may be the Consequence, the Fact itself is indisputable. The Weight of Paper certainly lies on the Side of Administration; that the Weight of Argument does not lie there too, it shall be my Business to shew: Not from any Resentment to M——s, for I am too inconsiderable either to love or hate personally Men, in a Sphere so much above me. But because I consider the Treaties as adopting a most ruinous System of Politics; and think that he who contributes his Strength great or little, to discountenance it

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for the present and all future Times, deserves well of the Public.

Two subsidy Treaties with *Russia* and *Hesse-Cassel* might have been made, with a double Intention, first, to assist our Allies, in case they should be attacked by *France*; and next to defend *H——r*, if the *French* should turn their Arms against that Country. The last is confessed on all Hands, to be an actual Design of the Treaties which we have concluded; and I am of Opinion it was the only Design, looking upon the Aid of Allies to be a mere colourable Pretext. But if I had thought otherwise, and approved the Treaties, so far as they concerned our Confederates: yet in the other Light I should condemn them as most imprudent and destructive Measures. Not because it happens to be *H——r* that they are to protect; for I will ingenuously acknowledge, that there could be no Room to apprehend any Project from *France*, to hurt his *M———*'s e——l Dominions, except in Consequence of the Quarrel between that Kingdom and *Great Britain*. Nay, I will own that we are bound in Generosity as well as Respect for our Sovereign to exert *all reasonable Endeavours* to shelter those Dominions from Injury, intended upon our Account. But I condemn the Treaties, as they aim at the Defence of *H———r*, by a System which is absolutely impracticable, surpassing the utmost Stretch of *Great Britain's* Ability to accomplish.

BEFORE

BEFORE I enter further into the Subject, I must premise, that all Strangers having been excluded from that great Assembly, where the subsidiary Treaties are said to have received so thorough a Discussion, and to have been agitated, on one Part at least, by such illustrious Abilities, I do not pretend to state the Reasonings there delivered; nor do I undertake more than to offer my own Sentiments, such as occurred upon reading the Treaties, and hearing what hath been alledged without Doors in their Vindication: and in order to state fully my Notions of the true Drift, Scope, and System of these Treaties, I will beg leave to suppose the M——r making his Speech in the C——t to explain the Ground-plot of this political Operation, as conceived in his own Brain.

THERE are indeed two noble Persons, Statesmen in Partnership, who are reported to have kept for some Time past the Keys of that sacred Recess, and who I believe have never parted with them out of Sight, notwithstanding what hath been so confidently given out by some Ill-wishers of theirs, that a third Person hath lately possessed himself of a false Key. I know not which of those two noble Rhetoricians to introduce as my Orator on the present Occasion; but as the Speech declares, occasionally, a very flattering Respect for H——r, I will take for granted, that they drew Lots or tossed up to decide upon whom the

the Benefit of so great a Merit should fall. Neither can I ascertain the Date of this Discourse, but we may suppose it uttered soon after the Resolution taken to send Succours to *North America*. I will state the imaginary M——r's Arguments fairly, and candidly, omitting the Graces and Embellishments of Eloquence; which however natural and proper to the Characters of both those accomplished Statesmen, yet are not imitable by my unskilful Hand. The Speech was in Substance as follows.

‘ YOUR M—— knows that altho’ I have only the Honour to be a M——r of *Great Britain*, yet I have been always proud to consider myself as a Servant of your E——l Dominions. Those of my Predecessors, whose Example I am most desirous to copy, acted with an uniform Attention to the *Germanick* Part of your Interest; and I should be unworthy of the Distinction, Favour, and high Office which I enjoy, if I could pursue those Interests with a Zeal less ardent, a Diligence less active, or a Precaution and Foresight less wary and vigilant than theirs. It is the Apprehension of Evil, threatening H——r, which now fills my Mind with unfeigned concern. And what adds (if possible) to my Uneasiness, is that this Danger proceeds from *Great Britain*, and arises from her Embroilments with *France*. For if there were no Mixture of *British* Consideration in the Risques to which H——r is

exposed, I should have the more unquestionable Proofs to give of the Purity of my Affection to that Country.

THE continued Encroachments, Injustice, and Violence of the French in *North America* have at length exasperated the *British* Nation and drove us to the Necessity of vindicating our Rights by Arms. And if the Contest between the two Nations be confined to the Sea and to *America*, the Superiority of our Navy over the Fleet of *France* and the Inequality of *American* Force in our Favour hold out, all the Hopes of a successful Issue that human Probability can give. By a War thus pursued we might reasonably expect to dictate Terms of Peace in the End, and prescribe to the *French* the Boundaries of their Empire in the Western World. For if the Interests of your Island were disconnected from the Rest of *Europe*, the *French* would have no Resource to counter-act our Operations, except an Attempt to invade us. An Enterprize little less than desperate, if this Kingdom were prepared, as it might be, for their Reception: Since they would contend against all Chances; aiming to transport an Army across the Sea in spite of a stronger Navy, and that Army to maintain its Ground against a powerful Body of regular Forces in an Enemy's Country, where every Inhabitant is an implacable Foe to the Invader, and Reinforcements not to be sent from *France*, but under the same Difficulties. In such a View

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of Affairs we see nothing but Perplexities on the Side of *France*, and a fair Prospect on the Part of *Britain*.

BUT if our Advantage in these Particulars be thus apparent to us your M——'s M——s, it cannot be supposed to escape the Discernment of the *French* Administration; for in speaking of the Counsellors of foreign Princes, common Modesty forbids to presume ourselves wiser than they are. Which way then can *French* Policy turn itself, conscious of their Inability to withstand the War of this Island, and and yet resolved to retain their unjust Possessions to the last. Nothing remains but to cast their Eyes upon the Continent of *Europe*, there indeed we have a precious Pledge, justly precious to your M——, thrice precious to your faithful Servants; which, if the *French* can wrest it from us, will cast the Ballance in the Account of War entirely in their Favour. For if this Event should happen, in vain would your Navies triumph, and your *American* Subjects conquer. Pitiful and ungrateful would be the *British* M———r, who could hesitate to surrender all these lesser *American* Advantages, and to accept of any Terms of Accommodation for the Sake of regaining a Territory so important to your M——'s personal Interest, and so essential to your Figure and Greatness in the Eyes of all *Germany*; and as necessity seems to point out to the *French* this Plan of Operation to wound *Great Britain* through

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the Sides of *H——r*, so *France* appears to be provided with suitable Means for carrying that Plan into Execution. Besides their own immense Armies and Resources almost inexhaustible, the King of *Sweden* is their fast Ally: the King of *Denmark* their subsidiary; The Elector of *Cologne*, ready to permit the Erection of Magazines in his Country for the Maintenance of *French* Troops marching into *Westphalia*; and what is most material, the King of *Prussia*, at the Head of one hundred and fifty thousand of the best disciplined Troops in *Europe*, hath been long the Pensioner of *France*, cannot exist without her Support, holds unnatural but determined Enmity to your *M——*'s Person, and, in Addition to the rest, happens to be situated within a few Days March of your electoral Capital.

When I consider this military Monarch, conducting his Troops to the Borders of that helpless unfortified Country (the same Troops which so lately overrun the Electorate of *Saxony*, and took a quiet Possession of *Dresden* :) When I consider the numerous Armies of *France* pouring from another Quarter to the same Destination (I own my Weakness) the Idea terrifies me and shakes every Joint of my Frame. Many an anxious Hour have I devoted to devise Means of resisting so mighty a Torrent, and I esteem myself the happiest of Ministers in having found out at last an effectual Counter-project to the pernicious Designs of *France*; which I do
now

now humbly presume to lay at your royal Feet. It is — to collect an Army upon the Continent of *Europe* large enough to withstand an hundred thousand *French* seconded by an hundred thousand *Prussians*. For altho' these Powers in Conjunction, may command many more than two hundred thousand Men, yet I think they cannot conveniently detach a greater Number from their respective Territories.

But how shall an equal Army be obtained to face an Enemy two hundred thousand strong; I answer, by a Method plain, expeditious, and not untried to a certain Degree by this Country. We will offer every Court in *Europe*, that is not leagued with *France*, their own Terms to furnish as many Troops as each can spare. *Hesse-Cassel*, to do her Justice, hath been ever ready to take our Money. *Wolfenbuttle* hath not been backward upon Occasion; *Saxony*, *Bavaria*, and even the Empress Queen of *Hungary*, have the Sensation of our Gold still recent in their Palms. The Empress of *all the Russias*, is indeed an august and resplendent Princess; yet even she perhaps may think it no Diminution of her Greatness, to accept an annual Present from *Britain*, under the honourable Title of a Subsidy. And if she cannot be brought to lend a great Body of Forces to the direct Defence of *H—r*; She may however be prevailed with to cause a Diversion of the Enemy's Force by a formidable Irruption into the King of *Prussia's* Dominions,

In case he shall move a Soldier in the Cause of *France*. This high and respectable Empress entertains an inveterate Hatred to his *Prussian* Majesty. and she not only keeps an enormous regular Army, fosters a Nest of *Cossacks* and *Calmucks* and other Irregulars, Men familiar with Ravage, Devastation and Slaughter. Thus to Gratification of her Vengeance, co-operating with *British* Money, why might she not at a proper Season carry Havock, and let slip these Dogs of War to plunder, burn, and destroy the King of *Prussia's* Country; fifty or sixty Thousand *Russians* (regular and irregular) hovering on the Frontiers of *Livonia* at no great Distance from Part of the *Prussian* States; would keep that Monarch in check, overawe his Complaisance to the *French*, and deprive them wholly of his Succour. In this Event, there will remain no more than one hundred Thousand *Frenchmen* to encounter. And the Contributions of Soldiers from the several *Germanic* Powers, before enumerated, and as many more as may be necessary, will, when joined to the national Troops of *H——r* compose a solid Mass of Resistance impenetrable to the Arms of *France*. Now this State of Affairs in *Europe*, it is evident, will put *Great Britain* exactly upon the same Footing as if she had no Interest or Concern upon the *European* Continent. For, the *French* and their grand Ally will be compleatly disposed of, and disarmed of their Power to in-
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jure your M——'s e——l Dominions: and *Britain* in the mean while attending to her own Business, may exert as much Vigour as she can in the Prosecution of her naval and *American* Wars."

HERE the Speech of the M——r ended, and a Conversation ensued upon the Subject of Subsidies; from whence it fell by a natural Transition to several Pensions which it would be necessary to grant very soon out of the *Irish* Establishment. In fine, the Minister made his Bow with obsequious Devotion, and retreated backwards out of the C——t, locking the Door after him.

THE Project comprehended in this imaginary Speech hath been partly reduced to Practice, according to my Notions, in the Treaties with the Landgrave of *Hesse-Cassel* and the Empress of *Russia*. With Regard to these Treaties therefore I will endeavour to shew;

FIRST, That they were advised, framed, and executed by the M——rs, not with a View to the Defence of *Great Britain*, in case it should be invaded by *France*: not with a View to protect the Allies of *Great Britain*, if they should be attacked by *France*: but purely and merely for the Security and Preservation of *H——r*, against the Attempts of *France* and her Confederates; which I believe to be so entirely the Drift and Object of the Treaties,
that

that I am convinced they would not have been made, had not that E——te belonged to the Sovereign of this Island.

SECONDLY, The two Treaties in question must be considered as Parts of a vast comprehensive System, to gather and combine the Powers of the *European* Continent into a defensive Alliance, of Magnitude sufficient to withstand the utmost Efforts of *France* and her Adherents against the E——te; and all this to be effected at the Expence and Charge of *Great Britain*.

THIRDLY, I conceive this whole System and Scheme of Politics, in the Lump, to be absolutely impracticable.

FOURTHLY, This unfizable Project, impracticable and desperate as it is, with respect to all human Probability of Success, will, if fully pursued bring Bankruptcy upon *Great Britain*.

FIRST, As to the first Point, viz, the Design with which the two Treaties are negotiated, I have heard many Uses given to them in Conversations, which did never enter into the wise Head that hatched the Measure. The refined Subtlety of Lawyers, the profound Speculation of Negotiators, the Craft and Acuteness of practised Debators, being all set to work on this important Occasion, have fabricated a Variety of Reasons of the *ex post facto* kind;

kind; such as serve however for many of us vulgar Politicians to hang our Opinions upon, altogether as well as the real genuine Reasons of the Treaties, or perhaps better. And it must have been a pleasant Amusement to the two great State Associates to see their Followers discovering Motives which those Politicoes knew they never had, and descrying deep-laid *British* Advantages in a Transaction where *Britain* was not meant.

THE Treaties very intelligibly speak their Origin to be foreign. How would they be astonished, if they could hear the Comments of their Advocates, to find themselves naturalized in all Respects as *British* born Treaties.

To begin with the *Hessian* Treaty: It is argued, that *Great Britain*, being bound by Engagements, to furnish the *Dutch* and the Queen of *Hungary* with Forces in case they should be attacked; the present critical Situation of Affairs in *Europe* requires that we should procure Troops in Readiness to fulfil our Stipulations to those our Allies. And these Troops, it is said, ought certainly to be foreign, and not the national Forces of *Great Britain*.

Now pray consider what Likelihood there is, that this Motive could have any Share in the Treaty; neither the *Dutch* nor the Queen of *Hungary* are under the most distant Apprehension of an Attack from *France*. They have not added a Soldier to their Troops, or taken
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a preparatory Step of any Kind, against Hostilities : looking upon the Dispute between *France* and *Britain* to be the Concern of those two Nations alone. So that by this Argument, although the *Dutch* and the Queen of *Hungary* can discern no Danger, yet the *British* Administration undertakes to judge better of their Situation than those Powers do for themselves. Our Allies want no Succour, but our M——rs think the Succours ought to be ready, whether wanted or not. Our Covenants to send Aid are Conditions for the Benefit of our Confederates; those Confederates do not desire to put us to the least trouble upon their Accounts: But we beg the Favour to spend our hiring Troops for their Service, least they should stand more in Need of Assistance than they imagine. Such a forward and officious Zeal would manifestly be thrown away upon Allies who think they have no Occasion for it. But if we consider the *Hessians* are taken into our Pay for the Defence of *H——r*, the ministerial Prudence of the Measure will immediately appear, let the Danger, provided against, be ever so remote and speculative; for the less the Danger, the stronger is the Testimony of a tender Regard in Administration for that E——te; providing, with an Extravagance of Caution, even against the Possibility of Mischief.

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Besides, had the *Hessian* Treaty been really designed to make good our Engagements with the *Dutch* (for instance) we should have seen it exactly fitted to the Purpose. *Hesse-Cassel* would have been bound to us in Covenants answerable to those, by which we are tyed to the *Dutch*. Compare the *Hessian* Stipulations to us with ours to the *Dutch*, and see whether they tally. *Hesse-Cassel* undertakes, for a Subsidy or Pension of between Thirty and Forty-Thousand Pounds a Year, besides Levy-Money, to supply Six Thousand Five Hundred Foot, and Fifteen Hundred Cavalry (making Eight Thousand together) at the Requisition of his *Britannick* Majesty for such Services as he shall appoint.

By an old Treaty with the States-General in King *Charles* the Second's Time (still in Force, as I conceive) they are to furnish us with Six Thousand Foot, in case of an Attack upon *England*; and we are to aid them in the like Exigency with Ten Thousand Infantry. Cavalry, I presume, were then omitted on both Sides, because of the Difficulty attending the Conveyance of such cumbersome Bodies across the Water. What then is the Use of *Hessian* Cavalry to the Execution of our *Dutch* Engagements? I will lay down two Assertions on this Matter, in spite of all the Mob of ministerial Pamphleteers before-mentioned, who will all be

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ready

ready to contradict me. First I do take upon me to affirm roundly, That Cavalry are not Infantry. And secondly I must assert, That Six Thousand Five Hundred Foot are not Ten Thousand.

Indeed His Serene Highness the Landgrave of *Hesse-Cassel*, in Consideration of proportionable Advancement of Money, " Does
 " engage to augment his Corps of Subsidiary
 " Forces with an additional Body of Three
 " Thousand Three Hundred Foot, and Seven
 " Hundred Horse or Dragoons; and,
 " consequently, to raise his said Corps to
 " the Number of Twelve Thousand Men,
 " as soon as His Majesty the King of *Great-*
 " *Britain* shall judge it necessary or advantageous to his Service." And they shall
 " be delivered, and join the First Body of
 " Eight Thousand Men within Six Months
 " after the Demand of them shall be
 " made." So that the Landgrave is not bound to deliver at Market the last Drove of Soldiers, till the very last Day of Six-Months from the Requisition (and by the bye, the Cavalry even of the first Allotment of Troops is not obliged to march within less than Six Months Notice) But our Engagement to the *Dutch*, is to assist them with Ten Thousand Infantry, within Two Months from the Time of their Demand. Wherefore the *Dutch* have a Right to call upon us for Execution of Contracts, before

we can make the same Claim upon the Landgrave of *Hesse-Cassell*. The two Treaties then do not coincide with each other, either in the Species of Troops, or in the Number of Men, or in the Time of sending the Succours.

Nor is there any better Pretence to ascribe this Treaty to our Connexions with the Queen of *Hungary*, than to those with the *Dutch*. For, by the Quadruple Alliance 1718, the King of *Great-Britain* is obliged to furnish the Emperor and his Successors in case of Attack with Eight Thousand Foot and Four Thousand Horse. But the *Hessian* Treaty is evidently not accommodated to discharge this Obligation, as exceeding the just Measure in the Number of Foot, and falling short in the Proportion of Horse. For we may demand of *Hesse-Cassell* no less than Ten Thousand Foot in two Parcels; but no more than One and Twenty Hundred Cavalry. And, besides, the Queen of *Hungary* (as well as the States-General) is intitled to our *Quota* of Auxiliaries within two Months after Requisition.

After all, the Argument, of putting ourselves into a Condition to make good our Alliances, concludes for Twenty Two Thousand Subsidiary Troops instead of Twelve Thousand. For the Queen of *Hungary* in *Flanders*, and the *Dutch* in their Barrier might be both attacked by *France* at the

same Time, and this Event was at least as probable as a separate Attack upon either. In this Case we are bound to execute at once our Stipulations with both those Powers, and to supply the one with Ten Thousand Men, and the other with Twelve Thousand, And had our Administration proceeded to hire this whole Number of *German* Forces, during the last Summer; I question not but we should have heard the same Argument founded in Coffee-Houses, — “ We ought to “ be prepared to fulfil Engagements to our “ Allies.” And the Argument would have been believed in by those who come endued with the proper previous Grace, and true ministerial Ears to hear. Being my self disposed to pick up any tolerable Opportunity of complimenting the Administration; I will render them their due Praise upon the present Occasion. It is plain, they are justified in the Thoughts of their Friends, as to the *Hessian* Treaty, by a Method of Reasoning, which would have equally approved their Conduct, had it gone farther in the same Tract. Had they subsidized any other *German* Prince or Princes for Ten or Twelve Thousand more Troops, their Well-wishers would have felt the same Contentment, extolling the Punctuality of Administration in keeping Faith with Allies. I commend, therefore, the Temper and Moderation of these wary Statesmen in squandering publick Treas-

Treasure. They have only thrown away a large Sum, when they might with the same Facility have wasted double the Money.

It is further urged in Behalf of the *Hessian* Treaty, that it was necessary for a Purpose still more important to *Great-Britain*, than even the Assistance of her Allies: To defend the Kingdom against a *French* Invasion. To transport a Body of disciplined Troops into our Island in a Time of the most urgent Distress, and add Reinforcements to her Army when most she may need Assistance.

I have observed, that tho' this Argument hath frequently been used, it hath scarce ever been much pressed; and the Reason I take to be, because it cuts with two Edges; for if the Danger from *France* was understood at the Time of signing the *Hessian* Treaty, to be real and substantial enough to demand the levying of foreign Troops for the Security of this Country, why was not the common Safety provided for at the same Time, by a vigorous Augmentation of national Troops? The House of Commons foreseeing that an Assertion of our Rights in *North America* might produce a Rupture between *France* and *Britain*, enables the Administration by a Vote of Credit, the 27th of *March* last, to "augment his Majesty's Forces by Sea and Land, and to take such Measures for the Security of his Do-
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“minions, as may be necessary in the present
 “Conjuncture.” The M——s, free from
 the Terrors of an immediate Descent by the
French, take a cool Resolution to encrease
 the Land Forces by an Addition of five or
 six thousand Men: They determine to put
 the Kingdom into a Posture of Defence ra-
 ther firmer than a Season of profound Re-
 pose would strictly require; and upon this
 calm Principle the Levy of Soldiers in *Eng-
 land* proceeds leisurely. But on a sudden the
 Alarm is caught, an immediate Peril springs
 up of an Invasion from *France*, foreign
 Troops must be hastily gathered, and a sub-
 sidiary Treaty is signed with the Landgrave
 of *Hesse-Cassell* on the 18th of *June*. On the
 next Day, *viz.* the 19th of *June*, the Dan-
 ger vanishes out of Sight at once, and all is
 Security and Safety again: No Thought
 arises of any further Augmentation of *Bri-
 tish* Troops; but the first placid Resolution
 continues until the Meeting of Parliament.
 — I do not intend to consider here what Au-
 thority the Vote of Credit gave to conclude
 the *Hessian* Treaty; I would only observe,
 that our M——s have not applied the Vote
 at home like Men apprehending their Coun-
 try to be in Danger of an Invasion; and
 therefore no Treaty can be supposed to pro-
 ceed from such Apprehensions. In truth, with
 respect to our own Defence, the Hire of fo-
 reign subsidiary Troops seems improper to any
 other

other Occasion, but that of an Attack ready to burst upon us, before we can have Time to raise an internal Force : In such a Conjunction foreign Soldiers ready raised and disciplined are the best Resource ; but if the Danger lies at a Distance, expected by probable Speculation in the Course of a War, we ought to draw together in due Time, a Strength of our own ; and what Number soever of Troops may be deemed sufficient, it were to be wished, in my Opinion, that they should be all national Troops, instead of any foreign Subsidiaries ; for the first are always upon the Spot, where they are wanted ; whereas the others must be demanded before they can quit their own Territories : Their Passage requires Time ; their Transportation across the Sea is subject to Casualties and Disappointments, and they are liable to a Recall for the Service, or at the Caprice, or by the Infidelity of their Master, in a Minute of the most important Consequence to *Great Britain* ; not to say any Thing of the Spirit, which it is natural to expect in Men fighting for their Country above that of mere Mercenaries acting in the Trade of War.

By the third Article of the Treaty in question, the Landgrave of *Hesse-Cassel* promises,
 “ That his Infantry (consisting of Six
 “ Thousand Five Hundred Men) shall be
 “ in a Condition to march for the Service of
 “ his *Britannic* Majesty, two Months after
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“ the Requisition shall have been made for
 “ that Purpose, or sooner, if possible, *especially*
 “ *if it should be for the immediate Defence of*
 “ *the Kingdoms, or Electoral Dominions of*
 “ *his Majesty, or of the Low Countries.*”

This Article contains all the Services which any Body ascribes to the *Hessian* Forces, except that of assisting the Queen of *Hungary*; they may by this Clause be employed in Defence of the Low Countries, or of his Majesty's Kingdoms, or of his Electoral Dominions. But I have shewn that the Queen of *Hungary* and the *Dutch* have really nothing to do with the Business, and that the Defence of these Kingdoms is a mere colourable Pretext, not the true End and Motive of the Treaty; from whence it appears, that the real and genuine Object could be no other, but the Security of his Majesty's electoral Dominions.

I will next proceed to examine the *Russian* Treaty, and to shew that the whole Tenor of it is directed at the King of *Prussia*, and him alone, calculated finally to intimidate that Monarch from assisting *France* in any hostile Project which she might form upon the Electorate of *H———r*; and with no other Design whatsoever.

It may be disputed by some Men whether *H———r* be the only Object of the Treaty, and it may be disputed by others, whether the Treaty be not intended for other Pur-
 I poses,

poses, besides awing the King of *Prussia*. But no Body who hath read the Treaty will deny, that his *Prussian* Majesty is at least one of the Powers proposed to be kept in Order by it. This indeed hath been contended for as a principal Justification of the Measure. However, it may be proper to produce the Articles concerted against the King of *Prussia*, because the same Articles will prove, that the Treaty cannot be made Use of and applied to any other End than that of restraining the Activity of this potent Monarch.

Article the second, reciting that the Parties to the Treaty had agreed to settle the Means of their Defence, proceeds thus.—
 “ With this View her Imperial Majesty of
 “ all the *Russias* has not only caused to
 “ march towards the Frontiers of *Livonia*,
 “ adjoining to *Lithuania*, but engages also to
 “ hold there as long as this Convention
 “ shall subsist, as near to those Frontiers as
 “ the Quarters shall permit, a Body of her
 “ Troops amounting to Fifty five Thousand
 “ Men.” viz. Forty Thousand regular Infantry, and Fifteen Thousand Cavalry, composed of Cuirassiers, Horse-Grenadiers, Hussars, Cossacks, and Calmucks.

Article third: “ Her Imperial Majesty
 “ engages moreover to cause to be held in
 “ Readiness, during the Time above specified, on the Coasts of the above mentioned Province, forty or fifty Gallies, with
 D “ the

“ the necessary Crews, in Condition to act
“ on the first Order.”

Article fourth: “ The Body of Troops,
“ and the Gallies mentioned in the two pre-
“ ceding Articles, shall not be put in Acti-
“ vity, but in case his *Britannic* Majesty,
“ or any of his Allies, should be attacked ;
“ and in that Case the general Commander
“ in chief of the said Corps (who for this
“ Purpose shall be furnished before Hand
“ with the Orders of her Imperial Majesty
“ of all the *Russias*) shall march as soon as
“ he shall receive the Requisition of the
“ Part of his *Britannic* Majesty ; and shall
“ make as soon as possible a Diversion with
“ a Body of Thirty Thousand Infantry,
“ (provided with the necessary Artillery)
“ and with all the Fifteen Thousand Caval-
“ ry above mentioned, and shall embark, at
“ the same Time, the other Ten Thousand
“ Infantry on board the forty or fifty Gallies,
“ in order to make a Descent, according to
“ the Exigence of the Case, and the Utility
“ of the Service.”

Article seventh: “ Whereas her Imperial
“ Majesty of all the *Russias* is particularly
“ interested in the Preservation of the Tran-
“ quility of the North, and that no Inno-
“ vation should happen in the Neighbour-
“ hood of her Dominions ; considering al-
“ so the Proximity of the Countries where-
“ in the Diversion in question will most
“ pro-

“ probably be made, and the Facility her
 “ Troops will have of subsisting immediately
 “ ly in an Enemy’s Country, she takes upon
 “ herself alone, during such a Diversion, the
 “ Subsistence and Treatment of the said
 “ Troops by Sea and Land : As also, the
 “ heavy Artillery which they may have Oc-
 “ casion for, and of the Details thereto be-
 “ longing.”

Article tenth : So much as relates to the
 present Purpose is as follows, viz. “ The
 “ auxiliary Body shall be commanded solely
 “ by the General whom her Majesty, the
 “ Empress, shall put at their Head, to
 “ whom also the Person who shall com-
 “ mand the Gallies is to be subject.”

Article eleventh : “ All the Plunder
 “ which the *Russian* Troops shall gain from
 “ the Enemy, of what Nature and Quality
 “ soever, shall be for the Advantage of those
 “ same Troops.”

Article twelfth : “ In case these auxiliary
 “ Troops shall be obliged to pass in their
 “ March the Territories of the Repub-
 “ lick of *Poland*, his *Britannic* Majesty
 “ takes upon himself the Care of obtaining
 “ from his *Polish* Majesty and the Republic
 “ of *Poland*, free Passage through the said
 “ Territories.”

It is evident enough, that all the Circum-
 stances in these Articles are adapted to an In-
 vasion of the King of *Prussia*, whenever it

shall be thought expedient. The Plan of Operation for the *Russian* Forces is delineated. They are to be divided into two Bodies, one of Forty Five Thousand Men, and the other of Ten Thousand; and the last Body is to embark on board forty or fifty Gallies: So that they are to act by Sea as well as Land; and both Divisions are to act in the same Expedition; for the Commander of the Gallies is to be subject to the General in chief of the Army, which would be useless in Expeditions independent of each other. Now the King of *Prussia's* Dominions are liable to an Attempt both by Sea and Land at the same Time; Regal *Prussia* being a maritime Country open to a Descent by Sea, and likewise accessible by Land to an Army marching through *Poland*. — Again, the *Russian* Auxiliaries are to be kept upon the Frontiers of *Livonia* adjoining to *Lithuania*, and the Gallies upon the Coasts of *Livonia*; and the Empress undertakes to maintain her own Troops, because soon after their March out of her Territories, they may subsist by free Quarter and Plunder, on account of the Proximity of the Country where they are to make the Diversion; so that the Country of *Russian* Diversion lies in Proximity to the Frontiers of *Livonia*, adjoining to *Lithuania*, and also in Proximity to the Coasts of *Livonia*. But regal *Prussia* answers to both Descriptions, being separated from *Livonia* by the

the Dutchy of *Lithuania*, at the Distance of not many Days March for a *Russian* Army by Land; and being divided from *Livonia* towards the Sea by the Shores of *Courland* and *Samogitia*, within Reach of the *Russian* Gallies in two or three Days sailing from the Coast of *Livonia*.

Now, if the Intention of the *Russian* Troops, hovering upon the Frontiers of *Livonia*, be (as most certainly it is) to fall upon the King of *Prussia* in case he should stir in the Quarrel of *France*: It seems very improbable that the same Troops should be destined to any other Service whatsoever. Because in the Moment when they are all departed from the Frontiers of *Livonia*, the King of *Prussia* finds himself at Liberty, as to any Hindrance that this Treaty will give him, to take what Part he pleases, and act in Conjunction with *France* after what Manner he thinks fit. The supposed Check, Awe, and Intimidation of that Prince must cease with the Removal of the *Russians* from his Neighbourhood to any other Expedition, and his Subjects might then sleep in their Beds, without dreaming of *Hussars*, *Calmucks*, and *Cossacks*. However, several fictitious Advantages have been ascribed to the *Russian*, as well as the *Hessian* Treaty. And it hath been said, that the King of *Sweden* being the pensioned Ally of *France*, and the Master of a considerable Navy, is disposed to join it
to

to the *French* Fleet. Nay, further, that he hath it in his Power to promote the Views of our Grand Enemy, by landing a Body of Troops in *Scotland*; which might be transported thither from *Sweden* with Security from our Men of War, necessarily stationed in other Tracks of Navigation. But that our mighty Auxiliary the Empress of all the *Russias*, will cast her ample Shield over this favoured Island, and protect it against the Machinations of all our Foes. That the King of *Sweden*, as well as his Brother of *Prussia*, will shrink at the Frowns of this formidable Princess, and be compelled to keep Peace for fear of drawing a *Russian* Invasion into his Country. — When I consider the prodigious Stress laid upon her Imperial Majesty, and the vast Effects said to be expected from her Assistance, I am tempted to look upon her as the Goddess of War, who with the Shaking of her Spear can strike Terror and Dismay into the Hearts of the most powerful and the bravest Princes, or by an invisible Influence confound the warlike Devices of mortal *French* Politicians, or with a secret and divine Energy break the best cemented Alliances to pieces. But when I consider the Matter stripped of all colourable Representations, I cannot for my Soul make more of it, than that the *Czarina* of *Muscovy*, for a certain Price, agrees to furnish the King of *Great-Britain* with
Fifty-

Fifty-five Thousand Soldiers. Let me suppose then, that these Auxiliaries are ordered away from the Frontiers of *Livonia*, to make a Diversion in *Finland*, or any other Part of *Sweden*. Who is left to curb his *Prussian* Majesty, while the Fifty-five Thousand *Russians* are engaged in *Sweden*? Or of what Avail is the *Russian* Treaty to prevent him even from over-running *H—r*, if he chuses so to do, when all the Precautions of the Treaty are laid aside, and the Force disappears which was designed to controul him?

Neither are the Provisions of the *Russian* Treaty suited to any supposed Scheme against *Sweden*. For the *Russian* Auxiliaries being situated on the Frontiers of *Livonia*, and destined to act in two Bodies, one by Land and the other by Sea, uniting in the same Enterprize; this Operation cannot be carried into Execution as to *Sweden*. Because *Sweden* happens unluckily to be divided from *Livonia* by the Gulph of *Finland*, and hath no where any Communication by Land with that Province, except by an unmeasurable Circuity. Further, the Treaty provides Transports for Ten Thousand Men: Very conveniently (as I have observed) for a Descent upon the King of *Prussia's* Dominions, which is to be countenanced by an Irruption of Land Force at the same Time. But if the first Division should be wholly
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separated from the other, and detached in Gallies to *Sweden*, both Corps will be weakened and disabled from any effectual Service against either *Sweden* or *Prussia*.

But if the *Russian* Treaty is not calculated for any Attempt upon *Sweden*, still less is it adapted to any direct Defence of our Allies against *France*: Altho' this be another of the fictitious Advantages attributed to the Treaty. For, suppose *France* should advance her Troops either into *Flanders* or *Holland*, I desire to know by what Article of the Treaty are we entitled to demand the March of our *Russian* Friends to the Aid of our Ally thus attacked? 'Tis plain to me, that we are not entitled at all. Her Imperial Majesty expressly covenants, that her Forces shall, in case his *Britannic* Majesty or his Allies should be attacked, cause a Diversion in the Enemy's Country. The Method of their Operation is laid down in the Treaty. And she no where obliges herself to act defensively, or in a direct Repulsion of an Attack made. And, consequently, if *Great-Britain* herself were invaded by *France*, we cannot call upon *Russia* for any of the Auxiliaries of this Treaty for our own Preservation.

But can we require of our Imperial Patroness under this Treaty to cause a Diversion in *France*, in case that Power, whose Conduct we are most immediately interested

in, shall attack *Great-Britain* or her Allies? In the first Place, by such a step, if it were taken, the *Russians* would leave the King of *Prussia* behind them, defeating the grand Purpose of the whole Treaty; but what comes more immediately to the present Point, The *Russians* cannot penetrate into *France*, without passing not only through *Poland*, but afterwards through *Germany*. And the Treaty makes no Preparation whatsoever for a March through *Germany*: Which shews, that a Diversion in *France* was not in the Contemplation of the Parties to the Treaty. — We see by the 12th Article his *Britannic* Majesty undertakes to procure a free Passage for the *Russians* through *Poland*: Because their March was to lye through that Territory to the *Prussian* Dominions. Had it therefore been intended in any Event to send the *Russians* through *Germany*, it would have been equally proper to settle the Business of a free Passage through the last Country; and when the first Case was taken Care of, the other could scarce have been forgot. But the Treaty is silent, as it must necessarily be, upon a Contingency never thought of by either Party.

Further, If the *Russians* may be called upon to make a Diversion in *France*, which lies at an immense Distance from the Frontiers of *Livonia*, and cannot be called, in

the Language of the Treaty, a Country in Proximity to that Province, I ask, Who is to maintain the *Russians* in their March along the vast Extent of *Germany*? The Empress undertakes the Maintenance of her Troops in the Expedition understood between the Parties against the Dominions of *Prussia*; because here they may subsist upon the Enemy's Subjects. That is, she undertakes to maintain them because they will maintain themselves. But in *Germany* they cannot live at free Quarter. Yet no care is taken of their Subsistence there, neither the Empress nor his *Britannic* Majesty engaging to support them. I am ready to admit that the Expence would certainly fall upon *Great-Britain* in the End (as all Expences have a natural Tendency to descend upon this our Island) but in the mean while this Article must be the Subject of a new Negotiation, and a new Contract. The present Treaty looks not so far. And in a new Negotiation, other Particulars might arise to be adjusted, beside the Nature and Quantity of Provisions for the Troops. Her Imperial Majesty might, perhaps, think it reasonable to ask a larger Subsidy for the Employment of her Forces at such a Distance from Home, and at such an Increase of Charges.

Thus it appears, that the *Russian* Treaty is not accommodated to make a Diversion upon

upon either *Sweden* or *France* in the Cause of *Great-Britain*; nor framed and suited to repel an Invasion by *France*, either upon *Great-Britain* or her Allies. Which I mention, not to blame the *Russian* Treaty as deficient in these Points; but to shew, that those Advantages ascribed to it are merely Imaginary, and that it is calculated in the Covenants, and was designed in Fact for no other Purpose, except to frighten the King of *Prussia* into Inactivity. And indeed it is Business enough in all Conscience for Fifty-five Thousand *Russians* to keep up a continual Alarm in the Breast of a Monarch, who commands near three Times their Number of as good Forces as the World can produce.

The Words of the Treaty, in Article 4th, are general, and include the Case of an Attack by any Power whatsoever, upon his *Britannic* Majesty or his Allies; but the true Meaning plainly appears to be confined to an Attack by the King of *Prussia*. And perhaps it might be decent to couch under those general Terms, the Notions which the contracting Parties entertained of that Prince's Disposition. It might have given unnecessary Offence to point him out by Name, as the Bull-Dog of *France*, set on to worry a Member of the *Germanic* Body; altho' this Opinion of him certainly lies at the Bottom. Which brings me to shew in the next Place,

That the Project of over-awing the King of *Prussia* by Means of the *Russians*, took its Rise from an Apprehension for the Safety of *H—r*; and was advised purely for that End.

The contrary, I know, hath been strenuously asserted by some People; who aver, That *France* is Mistress to draw the War where she pleases; That she may attack the Queen of *Hungary*, or the States-General, in Resentment of the Indignities suffered from *Great-Britain* at Sea: That this Event would kindle up a War upon the Continent of *Europe*: And therefore Prudence demands a timely Preparation of Confederacies to withstand the Power of *France*. But (say these Gentlemen) no Alliance can be more material to the Purpose, than our Treaty with *Russia*, altho' it be fitted to produce no other Effect than to keep the King of *Prussia* at Bay. For in the last *European* War, he constantly stepped forth to the Relief of *France* in the Pinch of her Distress. And when Prince *Charles* of *Lorraine*, having passed the *Rhine*, was ready to penetrate into the Bowels of *France*; the King of *Prussia's* Motions compelled the *Austrian* General to turn back in haste, and abandon an hopeful Enterprize, which might have put a speedy Period to the War. The like Disappointment should be guarded against for the Future. And if the King of *Prussia* can,

can; by the Terror of a *Russian* Army hung over his Head, be in a Manner disallied from *France*, a vast Weight will be taken out of the *French* Scale, and the Queen of *Hungary* set free to oppose her whole Force, in Conjunction with *Great-Britain* and her Allies, to the Efforts of *France*. Wherefore (conclude these Arguers) it is unfair to ascribe purely to Care and Tendernefs for *H——r* a Treaty, which true *British* Policy would have dictated, had *H——r* not existed. — I have stated the Argument fully, because it seems to be the Corner-Stone of their Reasoning, who pretend to justify the *Russian* Treaty. And the Argument we see is laid and bottomed in a Notion that *France*, exasperated with the Conduct of *Great-Britain*, may avenge herself upon other *European* Powers, because they happen to be united with this Island in a defensive League. For in any other Light, there is no more Sense in supposing that *France* may disturb the *Dutch*, or the Queen of *Hungary*, than the State of *Venice*, or the Republic of *Poland*, in consequence of a Quarrel with *Great-Britain*. Now, if it were possible in the Nature of human Affairs to foresee with absolute Certainty that *France* will not pursue this System of Revenge, every Man would laugh at the Absurdity of fetching Cautions from the Northern Pole against an Evil which was never to happen. But the future

future Conduct of States is not the Subject of mathematical Certainty, and who shall presume to foreknow the Resolutions of Politicians, a Species of Men that know their own Minds as little as the vulgar World do theirs? All this I do most readily acknowledge, and therefore Kingdoms, as well as Individuals, must be content to provide against the probable Injuries of each other; not waiting for unattainable Certainty on the one Hand, nor on the other, outrunning the Appearance of Danger, to bestow vain, impracticable, and endless Endeavours, to be secure from Mischiefs barely possible. Let us examine then, whether during the Negotiation of the *Russian Treaty* in the last Summer, there was a fair and reasonable Probability, such as might govern a sober Statesman, to suspect the *French* of Malice towards the Queen of *Hungary*, or the *Dutch*, on account of the defensive Alliances subsisting between them and *Great Britain*; and if there was no such Probability, I beg Leave, for once, to suppose our Statesmen so sober as to have made the Treaty with different Considerations in their Thoughts.

In the first Place, I desire to know whether any Example be extant in History, or living Memory, where the *French*, or any other civilized State, hath fallen upon another Nation, without Provocation received, or Suspicion of Hostility meditated; only because

because the latter happened to be engaged in a defensive Alliance with a third Power which had given Offence; for neither the *Dutch* nor the Queen of *Hungary* have offered the least Cause of Disgust to *France*; and neither of them can be suspected of a Design to join with *Great Britain* in an aggressive War upon *France*. Their only Crime consists in certain Contracts, formerly entered into, and still in Force, whereby the Parties agreed to defend and support each other when attacked. But the unprecedented Injustice of such a Proceeding in *France* is only a Part of the Argument; for, in the next Place, her Interest and the Plan of Policy which she hath adopted ever since the last Spring, concur with the Laws of Equity and Justice to restrain her. And these Laws, I imagine, must be of some Weight even with *Frenchmen*, when their Interest requires it. Why have they so tamely submitted to a continued Course of Indignities from *Great Britain* throughout the last Summer, down to the present Hour? Why have they seen their Men of War and Merchant Ships taken, their Trade distressed, and their Sailors detained in Prison, never offering to strike a Blow in Return, but suffering their national Pride to be mortified, and the Glory of their Monarch, the darling Passion of *Frenchmen*, to be sullied and tarnished? I defy any reasonable Admirer of
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the *Russians* to account for this unaccustomed Patience and Resignation of his Most Christian Majesty upon any Principle, but that of courting the *Spaniards* to his Alliance with a Shew of Moderation and Aversion to Violence on his Part, while the *English* on theirs are daily committing Acts of Outrage, Injustice, and Piracy.

This is well known to be the Language of the *French* in every Court of *Europe*, and particularly in *Spain*, whose Assistance would be of most Moment to them, as being the next maritime Power in *Europe* after themselves. And would it be consistent with such Language, and such Conduct, to make an Inroad upon the *Dutch*, or the Queen of *Hungary*, without a colourable Pretence of Quarrel, only because they are the peaceable Friends of a Nation that hath insolently presumed to disoblige *France*?

But after all, what prevails the most powerfully in my Mind with regard to the present Question, is a Consideration already mentioned, in speaking of the *Hessian* Treaty. Neither the *Dutch* nor the Queen of *Hungary* are one jot alarmed for their own Safety; therefore it were absurd to take up vain Fears and Terrors which belong not to us, and run to remote Corners of the Globe, bidding for Alliances in the Cause of Friends, who desire nothing from us but to mind our own Business. Nor

is it conceivable to common Sense, that our M——s should feel, for the Welfare of our Allies, a Sollicitude which hath never possessed their own Administrations. If such was the tender Sensibility of our Statesmen in other People's Concerns, we of this Island have Reason to wish, that they had reserved some small Portion of the same Anxiety for the Use of their own Country.

But if the Danger of our Allies be laid out of the Case, there will remain no assignable Motive for the *Russian* Treaty, except the Security and Preservation of *H—r*. And if the Truth were fairly and candidly owned, our M——s imagined that the King of *Prussia* might be instigated by *France* to make an Incurfion, or to countenance and support an Incurfion made by her Armies into *H—r*; and they judged it fit to gather a *Russian* Army in the Neighbourhood of the *Prussian* Territories, which might employ the Attention of that Monarch at home, and put it out of his Power to co-operate in the supposed Plan of his Ally and Pay-master: And perhaps the *French* might execute a Project of this Nature with a less flagrant Violation of Justice, than they could molest our Allies; for foreign Nations are not bound to distinguish between the R—l and E——l Functions of our Sovereign, and may think it lawful to retaliate upon his E——l Dominions for

any Affront received from him in the Capacity of King of *Great Britain*. How far our wise Men above mentioned were justified in their Alarms for *H——r*, by sound Sense and just Probability, or whether extreme Tendernefs and Affection did not, according to the ordinary Operation of these Passions, magnify a very remote Risk into an imminent and deadly Danger, I do not think it worth while to enquire, either Supposition suiting equally with my Argument.

Upon the whole, these are the Reasons that occurred to me in support of the first Proposition which I set out with; and they are such as convince me, that the Treaties with *Russia* and *Hesse-Cassel* had both the same Object, being framed and concerted for the Sake of *H——r* only; in consequence of a *British* Quarrel indeed, but not in the Pursuit of a *British* Interest, nor an Interest of *British* Allies. In short, that neither of the Treaties would have been thought of, had our Sovereign been less powerful, and possessed only the Dominions of *Great-Britain*.

I see plainly, that I expose myself by this explicit Declaration of my poor Sentiments to the trite Censure of Court Flatterers, who stand ready Day and Night with the Imputation of Jacobitism; but I despise the Charge, conscious that tho' his Majesty hath
many

many thousand Subjects of more Importance than myself, yet he and his illustrious Family have not a firmer Friend, nor a Friend upon more heart-felt Conviction. And however great or grievous may be the Evils accidentally springing to *Great-Britain*, from a Conjunction of foreign Dominions under the same gracious Sovereign; yet I know that those Evils are infinitely outweighed by the Blessings derived from his Establishment; being cordially persuaded, that no national Disadvantages soever, can stand a Moment in the Balance against the Felicity of civil and religious Liberty: Neither am I so absurd as to blame, on the contrary I sincerely applaud, the paternal Affection which his Majesty hath always manifested for his Electoral Subjects. It is his Duty and greatest Glory, as a Sovereign, to extend his Protection and Care to the People of all Denominations, who happen to be placed under his Dominions. And if upon any Occasion the Councils of this Country shall sacrifice the regal to the electoral Interests, those Men alone will be responsible for the Event; whose Self-interested Flattery shall have cultivated and cherished a Disposition, I will not say pardonable only, but in itself not unamiable. *Nescio qua natale solum Dulcedine captat*, is an old Observation upon human Nature; but such a Prædilection may be natural, which it may be unnatural in others to promote;

and very criminal to gratify at the Expence of Ruin to their own Country. I proceed with my Subject; and what I have to say farther, will be dispatched in a narrower Compass than the first Point hath been, because the Remainder will follow almost of Course from the Principles already laid down.

2dly. The next Proposition is, that the Treaties in question must be considered as a vast comprehensive System, to gather and combine the *European* Continent into an Alliance of Size and Strength sufficient to withstand the utmost Efforts of *France* against the Dominions of *H—r*; and all this to be effected at the Expence of *Great Britain*.

And here it must be remembered, that the whole Use of the *Russian* Auxiliaries is to watch the King of *Prussia* in their Quarters, upon the Frontiers of *Livonia*. And I will suppose this Disposition of the *Russians* to have its full Effect and Operation, and to confine his *Prussian* Majesty within its own Limits.—Now with respect to the King of *France*, when we recollect the immense Armies which he maintained during the last War, in different Places at the same Time; in *Germany*, in *Italy*, and in *Flanders*; and consider that in the present Conjuncture, his whole Force will be compact and directed to a single Object, it seems a low Calculation to assign him an Hundred Thousand Men
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for an Attack upon *H——r* *. How is this mighty Force moving towards *H——r* to be resisted, and what are the Precautions taken for that Purpose? The Fifty five Thousand *Russian* Auxiliaries stationed in *Livonia* being already disposed of, in observing the Motions of *Prussia*, must be excluded out of the present Calculation; and therefore the whole Dependance of *H——r*, as to any Measures already taken, must rest upon its own domestic Troops (counted as

* Since this Piece was written, and ready for the Press, the Town hath been apprized of a Treaty lately signed between *Great Britain* and *Prussia*; the Purport of which is said to be not only an Engagement of Neutrality on the Part of his *Prussian* Majesty, as to our Disputes with *France*, but also to hinder the Entrance of foreign Forces into *Germany*; which Event I heartily rejoice in, for the Sake of *H——r*, and also upon account of the Influence which the Care of that Country is likely to have upon our Affairs. One of the Stipulations of this new Treaty, regarding the King of *Prussia's* Neutrality, to whatsoever Cause it may in Truth be owing, will be ascribed to the *Russian* Treaty working upon his Fears: Whence Flatterers may take a fair Occasion to compliment the Sagacity of the Treaty-makers. All which I shall not controvert, as not concerning my Argument: But the other Engagement to oppose the March of Foreigners into *Germany*, certainly runs beyond the Policy of the *Russian* Treaty, which meant no more than to hinder his Junction with *France*. It was not, nor could be proposed by that Treaty, to force him to fight against the *French*. Nor was there ever any Advocate for the *Russian* Treaty absurd enough to pretend so much. This therefore hath nothing to do with the System of the *Russian* Treaty; on which Ground alone my Objections are built.

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between Twenty and Thirty Thousand Men) joined by our Twelve Thousand *Hessians* and a new Body of Twelve Thousand *Muscovites* demandable under a Treaty of the Year 1742. All which united do scarce exceed Fifty Thousand Men: Altho' in mustering this Army I suppose all the *Hessians* to march at once, whereas *Hesse-Cassel* is not obliged to send more than Eight Thousand at the first Requisition; and altho' I add Twelve Thousand *Muscovites*, whereas it is very doubtful, whether this Corps is not to be melted into the Fifty Thousand Auxiliaries of the late Treaty, and reckoned as Part of that Body.

Thus yielding all possible Allowances to magnify the defensive Army of *H—r*, and to diminish the *French* Aggressors, we find that our two Treaties, with every other Help, afford in Effect no more than Fifty Thousand Men to repel an Hundred Thousand. And this defensive Army is to engage double its own Number, not in a Country naturally strong by Defiles, or artificially secured by Fortifications; but champain and plain, with scarce a walled Town to stop an Enemy's Progress. --- Is it reconcileable with common Sense to suppose, That these two Treaties contained the entire whole compleat System of Defence for *H—r*, in case it should be attacked by

France

France and Prussia? Would not this be to expect Miracles, and depend upon a Reversal of the ordinary Course of Things for the Salvation of that Country; placing Victory upon Inferiority of Numbers, and estimating the Strength of one Man, as such, at the Value of two? The Treaty-Makers, tho' not remarkable Arithmeticians, are not so unversed in the Consideration of Numbers; nor so ignorant of what Importance a great Majority is in the Field of Battle as well as other Places. Now, if the Queen of *Hungary* and the Electors of *Saxony* and *Bavaria*, could be prevailed upon to furnish among them, in the Day of Danger, a Reinforcement of Sixty or Seventy Thousand Men, these Accessions might supply tolerably the Deficiencies of the Treaties with *Russia* and *Hesse-Cassel*, and accumulate an Army of an Hundred and Ten or Twenty Thousand Troops. Which might possibly enable *Hi——r* to look her Enemies in the Face with the casting Weight of Power on her Side, and a reasonable Prospect of Success, according to the ordinary Chances of War. So that our two Treaties were vain, inadequate, and insufficient, if the Advisers proposed to stop there, and proceed no further; but might be rendered effectual to the Purpose by a due Addition of Auxiliaries. --- Absurd, if intended to stand alone; but not void of Sense, as to the End in
View,

View, if designed to be followed with other Measures of the like Tendency.

In mere Civility, therefore, to the Authors of the Treaties, we must look upon these as Parts of a System, and Introductions to farther Alliances for Troops. And if so; I need not take much Pains to prove, that those Gentlemen could not expect to obtain such additional Alliances, but by the ancient and approved Method of Bargain and Sale.

Germany was undoubtedly the only Country from whence the desired Supplies of Strength might be drawn. And if the federal Laws of the *Germanic* Body subsisted with sufficient Vigour and Efficacy, to compel general Contributions of Succour to a Member of the Empire in Danger, this Method of Defence was certainly the most eligible of all. But why then did we interfere by hiring the Troops of *Hesse-Cassel*, when *H———r* should have been representing her perilous Situation, and demanding of the Landgrave her legal Aids? On the other Hand, if the *Germanic* Union be in Fact dissolved, notwithstanding the Continuance of ancient Forms; certainly no *German* Help could be hoped for but by the same Enticements which have wrought so successfully upon the Empress of *Russia* and the Landgrave of *Hesse-Cassel*. For Benevolence and Generosity are Virtues not
much

much practised by Communities towards each other. And Promises of Succour from one State to another, must either be reciprocal, or proceed from common Danger; or they must be purchased by a valuable Consideration. But the *German* Princes, independantly of the Imperial Confederacy, are not more affected by the Fate of *H——r*, than is any other Power with the Fortune of its Neighbour. Nor have the Queen of *Hungary*, and the Electors of *Saxony* and *Bavaria* more Connexion with the Safety of *H——r*, or greater Obligation to send her a gratuitous Aid than the Protestant Prince of *Hesse*. Indeed, had the Dispositions of *Germany* been ever so charitably turned towards the Relief of a Sister-State of the Empire in Distress; the Example of our Subsidies given to *Hesse-Cassel*, and to the Imperial Mistress of *Russia*, one of the greatest Potentates of the Earth, would have immediately quenched every Sentiment of Commiseration. And from that Moment, not a *Germanic* Finger would have stirred, unless it had been put in Activity by the Touch of Gold.

Now let any Man reflect upon the Extent of such a System, and resolve to his own Mind whether it be a practicable Plan of Politicks. Which is the third Point to be examined. A System whereby (it is evident) *Great-Britain* undertakes upon her

own Bottom, and by the Weight of her single Purse, to find sufficient Forces upon the Continent to resist any Efforts which *France* may think proper to exert in her Wrath, or her Policy, by her own Means, and her Confederates, against the Territory of *H——r*. And is not this a Task infinitely more arduous than what was allotted to *Britain* in either of the three last great Wars? In those grand Confederacies the Being, or at least the Welfare of all Parties was at Stake immediately or consequentially: And altho' we took a large Share, as in such Conjunctions it behoved us to do, contributing Subsidies to all the *German* Allies, and at the same Time straining every Muscle of our own Strength; yet the whole Burthen did not lie upon our Shoulders. The Allies defrayed the greatest Part of their own Expences. But in the present Contest with the ancient Enemy of *Europe*, in which we cannot expect the voluntary Concurrence of our old Continent Friends, *Britain* determines to retain and pay an entire grand Alliance of her own levying. Nor do I think it worth while to except the *Russian* Auxiliaries; notwithstanding they are pretended to be maintainable in Part by the Empress their Mistress. For, not to enter into the boasted Cheapness of the Bargain, wherein there seems to be a great Deception, it is enough for my Purpose,

pose, that we are to pay them Five Hundred Thousand Pounds a Year during the Time of their actual Service. As to the *Hessians*, they are, when employed, to be wholly supported by us, according to express Covenant. And the same Rule must, no doubt, govern all future Subsidiary Contracts with *Germany* under the present System. So that *France* in her outset, the Mistress of an immense Army, is to increase her internal Force as far as she pleases, and strengthen herself with the Purchase of such Auxiliaries as she can get to invade a Territory upon the Continent of *Europe*. And *Britain*, on the other Hand, with no better Stock to ingraft upon than the National Troops of *H——r*, is to make up the Difference by Money, to match Soldier for Soldier with *France*, and by Dint of Subsidies, produce an equal or better Army in the Field. And this enormous Attempt is to be made after an Experience of the vast Superiority of the Resources of *France* over those of our Island, in no less than three Wars upon the Continent within the last Seventy Years.

In the first of those Wars, the Kingdom of *France* stood forth almost alone. And the united Power of almost the rest of *Europe* was collected on the contrary Side: Their Arms, directed by the Genius and Experience of our immortal Deliverer King

William, one of the greatest Generals of his Time, *France* contending for Glory and Ambition: The rest of *Europe* fighting for Liberty and Security. Yet the Struggle continued for almost ten Years, with Advantage to *France*.

In the next great Confederacy of Queen *Anne's* Time, the shining military Abilities of the Duke of *Marlborough* were seconded by better Fortune, and the Allies triumphed over *France* in their Turn. The inglorious Treaty of *Utrecht* did indeed almost cancel our Successes, bestowing upon the Enemy infinitely better Terms than the Circumstances of the Time could warrant. Nevertheless, *France* had found Means within herself to sustain the War for above ten Years, against the joint Expence of various Nations, and at last was scarce more exhausted by continual Defeats, than *Britain* by her Share of the common Expence attended with repeated Victory.

The Fate of the last War waged with *France* upon the Continent by us and our Allies is recent in Memory. I heartily wish we could either forget it to spare a melancholy Recollection, or remember it for our future Advantage.

These several Experiments shew, That it would be Madness in *Britain* to contend upon her own Resources with a Nation, that in two Instances out of three hath been

been more than equal in the Means of a Land-War, to the same *Britain*, and the greatest Part of *Europe* beside in Conjunction. And in the third Instance, where that Nation was wasted and brought low, *Britain* also was consumed and reduced in equal Proportion; remaining in no better Condition at the End of the War to have made Head alone against her great Antagonist, than when both Parties entered into the Contest with their Vigour entire. — For this Reason I have not been moved in Point of Argument, by the melancholy Representations which I have heard of the Condition into which *H——r* might be plunged, had not our Ministers made the Preparation of these Treaties for her Defence. What! it is said, will you suffer a Country to be over-run for your Sake, and take no Step to save an innocent People, who must fall a Sacrifice to their accidental and unsought Connexion with *England*, unless you interpose. I own, it is impossible to put the Case of such an Event without Emotions of Compassion. But when I apply this Consideration to the Matter in Question, it loses all the Face of an Argument. For it is to say, Because we ought to assist *H——r* against the Consequences of a *British* Quarrel, therefore we should take Measures to support her, which will finally be fruitless and ineffectual. We owe
a Pro-

a Protection to that Country from Mischief in our Cause; and therefore ought to fight the Enemy in such a Manner as will not prevent the Mischief.

The *Germanic* Association was certainly formed for the Security of the Members of the Empire, that every one might find Shelter in the combined Strength of the Whole. Now, if there be any Solidity left in that Constitution, *H——r*, in Case of an Attack, may avail herself of a very considerable Force from the several Parts of the *Germanic* Empire, the Succours of honorary Allies, not of Stipendiaries, on which Occasion I think *Great-Britain* should join heartily in the Alliance, and give a very liberal Assistance. But if the Constitution of the Empire affords no Refuge, and yet no better Means of Preservation can be devised; what remains, but that *H——r* must submit to inevitable Necessity? It is Folly to think of altering the established Course of Things, and averting her Doom by the impotent Efforts of one single Ally, struggling with superior Power. For *Britain* is in Fact no more than one solitary Ally, if she must pay all the Troops which are to fight the Battles of *H——r*. That Nation, which is able to bring the most numerous Armies into the Field, and maintain them there the longest, must, humanly speaking, be

be victorious at last. And altho' this Island abounds in Subjects and in Wealth, and must always make a great and respectable Figure among the Powers of *Europe*; yet the most sanguine *Englishman* will not deny the Superiority to *France*: Which in a greater Extent of Territory, and a fruitful Country full of Arts and Manufactures, comprehends above double the Number of People; and possesseth, for ought I know, near double the Revenues, and Resources of all Kinds for a Continent War. I do not pretend to the Skill of computing accurately the Difference between us. It is sufficient to the present Purpose, that *France* exceeds *Britain* in this Comparison by manifold Degrees.

It is true, the Events of War are not infallibly certain: And the Battle is not always to the Strong. Which is a good religious Argument, not to place too much Confidence in the Arm of Flesh; but would be a mighty silly Reason in the Mouth of a Politician, to push a Nation headlong into a Species of War, desperate of all reasonable Chance of Success. And whatever may be our Obligations of Gratitude or Generosity in the present Conjuncture towards *H---*, I believe I need not quote *Grotius* and *Pufendorf* to shew that those moral Considerations do not require us to engage in an Enterprize,

prize, with all the Odds of human Probability in its Disfavour, and an Enterprize too which must involve the Kingdom in Bankruptcy and universal Distress.

This was the fourth Proposition laid down among the Grounds of my poor Opinion, with regard to the Treaties with *Russia* and *Hesse-Cassel*. And, if the precedent Reasoning be admitted, the last Point follows so evidently, that it would be an Affront to the Knowledge of an ordinary Tradesman to detain him with Proofs.

The Republic of *Holland* hath already fainted in the Race of our great and necessary Alliances against *France*. During Queen *Anne's* War, a certain Party among us was eternally grumbling at the unequal disproportionate Share that the *Dutch* took in it, compared with the Quota's of *Britain*. But Time hath confuted such Calumnies, to the Sorrow of that unhappy People; who concurred so sincerely and efficaciously from time to time in the common Cause, as to contract a Debt of Fifty Millions Sterling. And this hath proved a Burthen too great for the Sinews of their State to bear. For all the Taxes which their Government could invent, have come out (as I have often heard) insufficient for the current Services of the Year, and Payment of Interest to their Creditors. Whereby the Republic hath
lost

lost its ancient Splendor as a maritime Power, with all Significance, Weight and Credit in the Affairs of *Europe*, being unable either to assist a Neighbour, or defend itself.

How much further *Great-Britain* may go than *Holland* in borrowing Money, I will not take upon me to determine; nor am I Master of due Materials, to judge whether we may not sustain an hundred Millions of Debt with more Ease than the *Dutch* could bear fifty. But at the same Time I do not believe that the Directors of our Finances are much more knowing than myself in this knotty Question of political Arithmetic, and therefore I dare not trust their Discretion to make a full Stop at the extreme Limit of our Ability. Who can take upon him to say, that this Nation, robust as it is, will not totter under an Addition of twenty Millions of Debt? And is this Sum an exaggerated Computation in our Reckoning, if, besides the necessary Charges of the Nation in its own Concerns, we endeavour to fill up with Guineas the bottomless Gulph of a vast stipendiary Alliance?

The three last Wars with *France* cost *Britain* above an hundred and twenty Millions of Money, according to the best of my Information; which Sum amounts to the Rate of more than forty Millions to each War. If I were to be provided with Materials to be more exact, I should not think

it worth while to consult them for the Sake of Accuracy, the Immensity of the Sum being such by any Calculation, that a Mistake of many Millions can produce no sensible Abatement in the Argument; for whether forty or thirty Millions be the Medium of our former Expence in the three Wars with *France*, the present System of Politics, if carried roundly into Execution, presents us with an Effusion of Treasure still more enormous, because, in the first Place, the Maintenance of our just and necessary War in *North-America*, an Object which had no Place in the Times of King *William* and Queen *Anne*, and did not run very high in the late War, will prove a very inflammatory Article in our Account; and in the next Place, the Expence of paying and feeding those military Multitudes which fought the former Wars, was divided between the *English*, the *Dutch*, and other Nations, in the Alliances. All which Expence is by the System of our Treaties prepared for *Britain* alone; and when we consider, that such immense Issues of Money, outmeasuring any Experiment of past Time, are to be supplied by new Loans, heaped upon a Debt of eighty Millions, who will answer for the Consequence, or insure *Britain* against the Fate of *Holland*, to become a decayed, emaciated, consumptive Carcass of a State, scarce able to stagger upon its own Legs.

I have

I have now gone through the Task which I had imposed upon myself, and stated the Reasons which prevail with me to disapprove the Treaties with *Russia* and *Hesse-Cassel*, confining myself to the general Grounds, Plan and System of the Measure ; for, according to my Notions, the Treaties are not to be defended as relative to *H——r* (one of the Ends by the Concession of all Parties, and the only End in my own Opinion) but upon this Principle, that when we are engaged singly in a War with *France*, we must pay all *Europe* to form a defensive Army for the Safety of that Electorate ; a Doctrine not occasional or peculiar to the present Time ; but such as is equally to be put in Practice, whenever a Rupture shall happen between us and *France*, and a Doctrine which, according to all the Measures of human Probability, cannot be carried into Execution, but with Destruction to this Country ; for which Reason, it more imports *Great-Britain*, in my poor Apprehension, to check and discountenance these Treaties, than any political Step which hath been taken since the Revolution ; for I cannot figure to myself any Indignity, Injustice or Violence that *France* can offer us, short of an Attempt to conquer the Island, but what common Prudence suggests the tamest and most abject Submission to, rather than strive to vindicate our Rights or Honour by a Scheme of

Operation impracticable in the Execution, and ruinous in the Attempt.

When I heard last Summer of the Bargain with *Hesse-Cassel*, and the Negotiation with *Russia*, I could not help suspecting those two Measures to be meant as Links of a Chain of Treaties for the Safeguard of *H—r*; and my Suggestions were confirmed by Rumours from Time to Time of new Subsidies to *Saxony*, to *Wolfenbüttele*, and other Powers of *Germany*; but these Reports subsided by Degrees to my great Surprise, until I heard a Reason generally given for it. It seems two Gentlemen, then in very high Offices, had signified their Disapprobation of the System; the one a Person whose excellent Understanding, Integrity, and able Execution of Business in his Employment, had gained much Weight and Credit, and whose amiable Temper, and general Course of blameless Conduct, had created many Friends and Well-wishers without an Enemy. The other Gentleman, with an uncorrupted Heart, and a Greatness of Spirit above the Times in which he lives, was beyond all Comparison the most accomplished Orator that *England* hath produced in the present Century, if not in any Period of Time. The Authorities of such Opinions being considered as a serious Affair, all Arts were essayed to prevent its Effect: And it hath been confidently said, and not contradicted,

dicted, that the last mentioned Gentleman; in particular, was offered a Seat in the C—t, and the Conduct of the H——e of C——s, with all due Confidence and Power annexed; and that these Overtures were not at once rejected with peevish Disdain, or sullen Resentment, but upon repeated Conferences, and Conditions of a public Nature calmly and candidly discussed. He is said to have declared himself willing to acquiesce (out of Respect and Deference to ———) in the single Treaty then concluded with *Hesse-Cassel*, provided the Plan should be broke off at that Point. But if the public Treasure was to be diverted in a comprehensive Scheme of continent Operations, not affecting the Interests of *Britain*, from the necessary Occasions of our Naval and *American* Wars; neither his Duty to his Country, nor to himself, according to his Sense of the Matter, would permit him to undertake *the Conduct* and Support of such Measures upon any Terms the most flattering to his private Emolument and Ambition; but on the contrary, the same Duties would bind him to oppose the Measures with all his Might; he was answered finally, that the *Russian* Treaty then in Negotiation, could not be dropped, and the honourable Person accordingly refused the advantageous Offers which had been made.

The Dissent of these two Gentlemen, therefore, tho' not altogether successful in

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regard to the Public, hath been supposed to stop the Progress of the subsidizing Plan from running its full Career. And with regard to the first mentioned Gentleman, I have heard no Body impute his Conduct to Animosity; and the short History which I have given of the other, if it be true, shews his Mind to have been equally free from the Influence of that Passion in the Part he took. Neither could Ambition be the Motive to either, because there are no imaginable Views to distant Power, that could be improved by disobliging the Administration, or that were not perfectly consistent with the Situations in which they stood. Wherefore I am so weak as to believe they both acted from a nobler Motive than Resentment or Ambition: A Motive not to be comprehended by a certain Species of Men, who (in their own Language) are too Wise to quarrel with their Bread and Butter upon any Occasion.

The Issue of this Affair is well known. The Offers, which have been rejected thro' Scruple, in one Place, was carried to another; where, meeting with no Scruples, it was eagerly embraced. The Force and Efficacy of preventive Measures was applied with mighty Success: And the said two Gentlemen were dismissed from their Empl——ts, with the universal Acknowledgement of the World,

World, that these could not be so well filled by any other Persons.

If the Behaviour of those worthy Gentlemen hath been really been in any Degree instrumental in crippling the Scheme of Subsidies; we are all much indebted to their Virtue. Or if out of the Lottery-Wheel of Political Events in the various Shiftings of human Affairs, the good Fortune of *Great-Britain* should bring up any unforeseen Accident to supercede the farther Extension of Subsidies: Still the Public ought to acknowledge in those Gentlemen the Merit of having borne an honest Testimony, with the Sacrifice of their private Interests, against Measures, which are founded upon a System of the most fatal Tendency to this Country.

F I N I S.